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The publication in the Law Register, of the recent decision
of the Supreme Court of Michigan, in The People ex rel. 1e
Detroit, etc., R.R. Co. v. The Township Board of Salem (ante

487), holding an act of the le-islature authorizing municipalities to aid railroads, void, and the favorable comments by the
editors, have led some members of the bar of that court, who
dissent from this opinion, to desire that a strtement of the
grounds of this dissent should be published in like manner.
The first question to be regarded in considering the propriety of a decision of a court holding an act of the legislature
void, is the source and limits of the power of the court in
holding acts of the legislature void.
This is a subject which has been heretofore frequently considered by the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan, and the
rules laid down have been uniform. In Sears v. Cottrell, 5
Mich. 255, M.NNING, J., says: "The judiciary is not above
the laws and the Constitution. Its province is to declare what
'the Constitution and laws are, giving pre-eminence to the
former, and declaring the latter void only when repugnant to
it." In the same case, CHRISTIANCY, J., in the course of an
able discussion of the powers of a State government, says, p
257: "The purpose and object of a State Constitution are not
(649)
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to make specific grants of legislative power, but to limit that
power where it would be otherwise general, or unlimited."
Again, on page 258, he says: "Without any limitation of the
legislative power in our Constitution, that power would have
been at least as absolute and unlimited within the borders of
this State as that of the Parliament of England, subject only
to the Constitution of the United States. The simple creation
by a State Constitution of the legislative power without any
express, specific grant of power, and without any express limitation, would have conferred this unlimited power." Again, on
the same page, "From the principles above laid down, it follows
as a corollary, that an act of the State legislature not prohibited by the express words of the Constitution, or by necessary implication, cannot be declared void as a violation of that
instrument." Again, on page 259, "No rule of construction
is better settled in this country, both upon principle and
authority, than that the acts of a State legislature are to be
uresumed constitutional until the contrary is shown, and it is
only when they manifestly infringe some provision of the Constitution, that they can be declared void for that reason. In
cases of doubt, every possible presumption not clearly inconsistent with the language and subject-matter, is to be made in
favor of the constitutionality of the act. The power of declaring laws unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme
caution, and never where serious doubt exists as to the conflict." Judge CHRISTIANCY further shows in the same case,
pages 260 and 261, that an act can be declared void only when
it infringes some particular provision of the Constitution, and
not because it is opposed to the spirit of the Constitution
generally. MARN, C. J., concurred in the opinions of MANNING and CHRISTIANCY. CAMPBELL, J., alone dissented.
In the case of Tyler v. The People, 8 Mich. 333, MANING,
J., delivering the opinion of the court, says: " In Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251, we stated in substance if not in words, that
to warrant us in declaring a statute unconstitutional, we should
be able to lay our finger on the part of the Constitution violated,
and that the infraction should be clear and free from a reasonable doubt. We still adhere to the vievs then expressed." In
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Twtchel v. Blodgett, 13 Mich. 152, CHmsTINcY, J., quotes
from his opinion in Sears v. Cottrell, the main portion of the
extracts quoted above, and says that he has seen no reason to
change the views there expressed. In the same case, page 162,
CooLEY, J., says, "It is conceded to be the settled doctrine of
this State, that every enactment of the State legislature is presumed to be constitutional and valid, that before we can pronounce it otherwise, we must be able to point out the precise
clause in the Constitution which it violates, and that the conflict between the- two must be clear, or free from reasonable
doubt, since it is only from constitutional provisions, limiting
the legislative power and controlling the legislative will, that
we derive authority to declare void any legislative enactment.
And the rule so well settled here is not left in doubt by decisions elsewhere."
In The People v. .Aakony, 13 Mich. 501, CooLEY, J.,'again
says, "An unbroken series of decisions in this State has settled the rule of law, that before we can declare an act of the
legislature invalid, its provisions must be found to conflict
with the Constitution."
The decisions in 13 Michigan were made in 1865. There
have been no subsequent decisions modifying them until the
recent railroad decision. The quotations we have given, show
that in Michigan, at least, these two things were as well settled as anything can be settled by judicial decision. 1, That
no act of the legislature can be declared void unless it conflicts
with some express provision of the Constitution, and that the
court must be able to point out the provision. 2. That an act
of the legislature cannot be declared void if there be a reasonable doubt of its unconstitutionality.
The first of these propositions, three of the judges, constituting a majority of the court, two of whom are the same judges,
CHRISTmhcY and CooLEYwhose words we have quoted above,
.have set aside. They have done this, not by saying that on
further examination they are convinced that their former opinions are erroneous, but by holding the railroad act unconstitutional, without referring to a single provision of the State Con
stitution, or attempting to point out any conflict between the
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at declared void, and the fundamental law. Judge CooLEY,
referring to the taxing power, says: "It is conceded , nevertheless, that there are certain limitations upon this power not
prescribed in express terms by any constitutional provision, but
inherent in the subject itseli, which attend its exercise under
all circumstances, and which are as inflexible and absulute in
their restraints as if directly imposed in the most positive form
of words." If Judge CooLY means, by this, to say only, that
the Constitution may prohibit a certain thing by implication
as well as expressly, his doctrine is not necessarily in conflict
with his previous views, but in the application of the doctrine
to the case he should certainly'have shown the provision or
provisions with which, by implication, the railroad act is in
conflict. That he meant to assert that an act of the legislature
may be declared void, though not in conflict with any provision
of the Constitution, is shown where he says: "Equally superfluous is it to consider in detail the several express provisions
of the State Constitution, which the respondents suppose to be
violated." If in deciding whether an act is constitutional or
not, it be superfluous to consider an express provision of the
Constitution, that is to say, any provision for the word" express" adds nothing to the thought-then an act may be declared void, though not in conflict with the Constitution. Judge
CooiEY does, then, set up some standard aside from the writ.
ten Constitution by which to judge of the validity of an act of
the legislature.
In doing this he not only reverses what he
has so recently declared to be the settled law of the State, but
he leaves the constitutional law of this State in the most dire
confusion. If a law may be declared void because conflicting
with the notions of a court as to fundamental theories of justice not contained in the Constitution, then it is impossible for
a legislature to determine, with any certainty, as to the validity of the acts they are called upon to pass. Few laws of
general operation exist which do not conflict with somebody's
notions of right. Judges, like other men, are liable to have
very peculiar opinions as to fundamental theories of the true
sphere of government, and if they can set aside acts of the
legislature because in conflict with their opinions, all certainty
as to questions of constitutional law is at an end.

32T AID OF RAILROADS.

It seems clear, also, that the Supreme Court of Michigan
have abandoned the position that an act of the legislature cannot be declared void if there is a reasonable doubt of its uncon.
stitutionality; for acts.like the one before them, under constitutions not differing from that of the State of Michigan, so far
as this point is concerned, have been held valid by the courts
of twenty-two States of the Union, in many cases, after the
fullest argument and consideration. They have also been held
valid by legislatures and governors, almost without number.
Can it be possible that Judge COOLEY and his associates mean
to say that an act, the principle of which is sustained by such
a weight of authority, by the opinions of so many courts and
legislatures, is void beyond any reasonable doubt? To say
this, is to assert in them a confidence in their own opinions,
which is inexplicable. We prefer to believe that they have
abandoned. their former position, and now think it their duty
to declare an act void when such is the result of their examinations, whatever doubt there may be left in their minds.
Having shown that the Supreme Court of Michigan, have,
in their recent decision, overthrown what was before the settled law of the State, let us consider what principles they have
declared, on the basis of which they have held the act in ques
tion void. Having assumed to set aside an act of the legisla
ture for some other reason than because it conflicts with a written constitution, we should expect the greatest clearness in the
statement of the principles on which they have acted. We
regret to say that we find no such clearness. But so far as
we can, we shall undertake to state the principles on which,
either by implication or expressly, they have proceeded. They
say that taxation must be imposed for a public, and not a mere
private purpose. As a principle of natural justice, we think
this is true. But unless based upon some provision of the Constitution it is not in the province of a court to assert it.
,The court by implication, determine that it is their province
to decide whether the object of taxation in a given case is pub.c or private. INor do they confine themselves to ldetermine
whether the public interest may in any way be promoted by
the taxation in question. It is obvious to any one that the
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building of a railroad may be a great public benefit, and the
court do not deny this. But they say in effect, that though
the building of a railroad may be a public benefit, yet it is not
such a benefit as will authorizetaxation. In other words they
assume to themselves the power of determining what kind of
public interest will justify taxation, and what will not. The
power thus to decide upon the objects of taxationis one of the
most important of government. It is the power to decide upon
the objects of government. Upon no subject, perhaps, connected with government, have there been so many different and
conflicting theories. There is no subject which it is more im
possible to settle by general principles. It is also a matter
which may be of the widest public interest, one which may
excite the feelings and prejudices of opposing 'parties to the
highest degree. It sedms to us that it is dangerous for the
judiciary to attempt the decision of such questions. They are
too weak to put their unsupported philosophical theories as to
the proper limits of governmental power against the popular
will. Supported by plain constitutional provisions, they may
be able to stand the storm of general public indignation. But
without this, and when relying only upon their own notions
of what government should do, they are more likely to injure
their own just influence than to control the popular will.
Having assumed this power of determining the proper objects
of taxation, the Supreme Court of Michigan further decide that
taxation to aid the building of railroads to be owned by private
parties or corporations, is not lawful. We do not suppose they
mean to hold that States may not build railroads to be owned
by themselves, in the absence of constitutional restriction,
though the evils of this course would probably be much greater
than that of gifts in aid of railroads owned by oihers. The
principles which they announce do certainly go so far as this
that neither municipalities, a State or the United States, can
legitimately tax in aid of railroads owned by private corporations or individuals. This principle does not depend upon the
particular' circumstances of this time, but must be supposed to
be of general application. If correct then, if the United States
were at war and the building of a new railroad became a military
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necessity, it could only be accomplished by the direct instrumentality of the government. It could not be done by aiding
private corporations to build a road which the government
might use but not own. The military necessity for a railroad
could be provided for by the government in only one way, and
that probably, much the most objectionable. Again, if it is not
lawful to tax in aid of railroads, it is not lawful to give the
public property for a like purpose. The consequence is, that
all the gifts of lands by the United States, or individual States
to railroads, are void. The bonds issued in favor of the Pacific Railroad are void, as a matter of course.
The court undertakes to support the position that the public
benefit to be derived from railroads is not sufficient to support
taxation in their favor, by several considerations. They say
that this public benefit does not differ in kind from that derived
from building a mill or store. Concede this. It is also true
that the public benefit derived from the construction of a common road does not differ in kind from that derived from a rail
road. A common road is a means for the passage of passengers
and freight. A railroad is the same. Every means of travel
to and from a place is a benefit to the place. The less expense
involved in the transit, the greater is the benefit. The fact that
the common road is the property of the public, and the railroad
that of a private corporation, does not make the benefit in one
case to differ in kind from that in the other. The benefit in
both cases Is the same-that of cheapening the cost of transit.
So if taxation cannot be used in favor of a railroad, because
the public benefit derived from it differs only in degree from
that arising from the building of a mill, neither can it b
used in favor of a common road for the same reason.
A second consideration which the court uses in favor of its
general position is, that taxation is not lawful where the money
raised is to be given to some private corporation or individual,
and the only benefit which the public gets is incidental. This
principle, though perhaps sufficiently indicated in Judge
COOLEY'S opinion, is more fully stated by Judge CHR sTANcy.
It is a principle of very wide application. If money cannot be
raised by Taxation in favor ofprivate corporations, of course the.
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public property cannot be given to such corporations. All laws
giving bounties to any particular industries are void.
Al
tariff for the sake of protection come under the same head.
All gifts by the State to churches or private schools are void.
The hoisiesteads given to actual settlers are still the property
of the Uiited States. Neither do we see how, consistently
with"this principle, it is possible to justify the exemption from
taxationof churches, libraries, and private schgol property.
The principle carried out fully would destroy a considerable
portion of the legislation of almost every State in the Union,
as well as a large share of that of the United States.
AgainJudge CooLEYsays,that the public purpose for which
taxes iay, be raised, has no relation to.the public benefit to be
aerivedlthelefrom. The term "public purpose" is merely one
of "cclaaficAtion to distinguish the objects for which,according
to settled usage, the government is to provide, from those
which, by the like usage, are left to private inclination, interest or liberality." The argument, wesuppose, is that railroads
are not one of the public interests for which taxation can be
justified, because they have not become so by usage. To this
we say, that the practice of assisting railroads by public taxation has been so extensive in this country almost from their
origin, that it would seem to go far toward establishing the
necessary usage. But if no such usage had been established,
in the absence of constitutional restriction, what is to hinder
the present generation from adding a new usage ? Must this
generation live in the bands which the preceding generations
have' wnven without the possibility of adding new subjects to
t'nbse already recognized as fit for public support?
JudgeooLEY concedes that railroads are public in such sense
as t0justify the exercise of the right of eminent dontin in their
favor. He concedes them to be public then in a sense in which'
neither a store nor a newspaper enterprise is public. Ho,
then, does he know that they are not public in such senses that
the pubR6 money may not be used in their aid? The necessity
f6r-tlhe x&rcise of the right of eminent domain in favor of rail.
roads ray',be greater than that for taxation in their favor, and
the lawimaking power, may, perhaps, well enough make a dis.
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tinction between the two on this account, but where does the
court get its authoritity for making such a distinction ?
The substance of our criticism may be comprised in a few
lines. We say that the Supreme Court of Michigan have undertaken to establish a certain theory of the powers of government
not found in the Constitution olt the State. In favor of this
theory when established by the proper power, the people, as
zecently in Illinois, much may be said, and we have now nothing to say against it. But to its establishment by the court
there are two objections-First: It is in excess of their power
and hence becomes exceedingly dangerous as a precedent. Second: It interferes with vested rights which ought to be held
sacred. For a court cannot make new laws for the future
merely. What it declares to be the law is assumed to have
always been the law. Hence, if it assumes to set aside a principle which has long been acted upon, it destroys at the same
time all the rights which depend upon that principle.
In the case under consideration , the Supreme Court of
Michigan have destroyed millions of property whose holders
are as innocent of evil intent, or of even carelessness, as are the
holders of any other property. If the principles which they
have announced should be declared to be the law by the courts
of all the States and of the United States, it would destroy the
title to hundreds if not thousands of millions of property now
held by bonafide holders.
That any court should ever have undertaken out of its own
unsupported theories of government to announce a principle
thus destructive of vested rights will always be to us one of
the wonders of judicial decision.
C. A. KiNr.

The question of the power of towns, counties,. and other
subordinate municipal corporations to issue bonds,or otherwise
pledge their credit in aid of the erection of railroads and other
like enterprises, has been much mooted of late years. The
tendency of the courts has been generally to sustain the legality
42
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and binding obligation of such action, but the late decision of
the Supreme Court of Michigan, in The People ex rel. The Detroit and Howell B. B. Co. v. The Township Board of Salem,

published in the August number of the Register, goes to the
full extent of holding such subscriptions to be wholly void.
The opinion delivered by CooLEY, J., is elaborate, learned
"and exhaustive, and is highly approved in editorial notes attached to the opinion as there"published.
With the utmost deference and respect for the ability and
experience thus arrayed upon that side of the question, we yet
are constrained to differ in opinion, and submit the following
suggestions upon the other side.
The point of the decision made is that a railroad is not a
public highway in the same sense as a common road, but is a
private enterprise or institution, intended "primarily to benefit
a private corporation," though having also the effect to add
to the value of hands in adjacent localities; and that consequently, no tax can be laid, or corporate liability leading to
taxation incurred, in aid of it. We differ entirely upon this
point, and deem the arguments used to establish it fallacious.
In order to present our views intelligibly we propose in the
first place to set out certain general propositions which we
apprehend will not, at least after due reflection, be denied.
I. This matter of opening roads, canals, and other like improvements, is one which pertains not so much to law as to
politics. It is a branch of political economy. The State, or
the legislature acting in its behalf, is bound in all proper
ways to increase the public annual money income. Wealth
is power, in peace and in war.
The legislator, casting his eye, as it were, over the land,
perceives a certain tract which, though fertile and productive,
is yet of little value, for the simple -reason that it has no easy
access to a market. The cost of transporting its corps is
greater than the price to be obtained. It consequently yields
little or no net money income, and can pay little or nothing in
annual taxes f6r the support of the State. A road or a canal,
or, better still, a railroad, would set that land up close alongside the market. The effect would be that the expense of
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transporting crops is reduced to a mere trifle. Every penny
thus saved is so much added to the annual income of the land.
In view of this saving the land becomes more desirable and
rises at once in market value. Value depends upon, and is
graduated by, income. The land thus enhanced in value takes
rank with lands lying near to the market, and begins to contribute equally to the public burdens; and thus either adds
to the public income, or diminishes the burden upon others.
This matter of opening roads,and other means of facilitating
intercourse between distant localities, is one of immense interest and importance. The results are wonderful. England,it is said, owes her wealth and power mainly to the fact of her
having always had good roads. Massachusetts is to-day
wealthy because of her numerous roads. There is a vast field
for study and thought in this connection.
A road adds to
the value (by adding to the net income) not only of the farming
lands to which it leads, but of the lots in the market town;
to every foot of land along its whole length, and to lands
beyond and at its side; in a word, to every business locality
which by means of it is brought nearer (so to speak) to other
business localities.
II. The State possesses the eminent domain, to wit, the ulti.
mate or superior ownership of all lands lying within its boundaries. Individuals are permitted to acquire lands and thus
to own them, exclusive of all other individuals. But the
State has an ownership beyond this, and may at its pleasure
resume the actual possession. This cannot be done, however,
under our republican government,- unless the land is to be
taken for a public use.

This phrase, the public use, is one which, we submit, is often
misapprehended. It does not signify the public user-that the
land when taken is to be used, occupied, dwelt upon, traveled
over, or the like. The word use is, as an old English law,
synonymous (or nearly so) with benefit, behoof, and the like.
The wordpublic does not signify the individuals composing the"
body politic, but the State as a unit. In England the public
highway is more often called the king's highwayimplying that
the king, as representing the State, is the owner. So here
the
I
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phrase, public highway, means we submit, simply that the laud
embraced within its boundary lines is public property,to wit,
the property of the State as a unit; the State has asserted its
eminent ownership and thrust aside the private proprietor.
Lands are often taken under this right of eminent domain
which yet are never "used" or physically occupied by the indi.
viduals composing the "public"; as, for example, for forts,
penitentiaries, and the like, and yet such lands are confessedly
takqn for a public use. Personal property, as provisions, have
been destroyed by the State authorities to prevent their falling
into the hands of the enemy, and yet the taking for that purpose has been held to be a taking for a public use: Grant v.
U. S., 2 Nott & H. (Court of Claims Reports) 551.
IH. The public, meaning the individuals composing it, have
a right to travel the road, and do so; but the public, meaning
the State, does not travel or "use" the road in that sense.
The phrase the public use signifies then, we submit, the profit,
the pecuniary profit or gain of the State as a whole-the economical material advantage, or benefit to the body politic, as
such. This profit or benefit to the State comes from the
increase of the net annual income (and thereby of the market
value) of adjoining lands, in a word, an increase of the taxable
contributing capital within the bounds of the State, an increase of the fund in the hands of individuals out of which
annual taxes are to be paid.
IV. While the State as a unit, and the citizens and tax-payers
generally, are thus benefited, the lands themselves, which are
directly affected by the road, are benefited in a much higher
degree. They are, as it is often called, specially benefited.
The lands so benefited, are those which are, by means of the
road, set up nearer, and are by that means and process enhanced in value. There is a kind, or mode of" benefit,' 'styled
"local and peculiar," which is different from this, but need
not be defined here. Lands distant from the road, and not
made more accessible by it, are not specially benefited nor affected in value by means cf a diminution of taxes.
V. Upon taking lands for a public use, the State must make
compensation to the private owner. This it may do out of its
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public treasury, and out of funds raised by general taxatiou.
Lands taken for a street within the bounds of the city, or for
a county road, may thus be paid for. On the continent of Europe nearly all the railroads are built by the government, and
paid for, of course, out of the general fund of the State. The
State, instead of paying for the land out of its general fund,
may authorize the levy of a special tax for the purpose, and
raise it by taxation all over the State. It may, on the other
hand, raise this special tax out of the property "specially bene.
fited." This point has been often contested, but is now settled law, and is clearly just. This mode of taxation is styled
the "assessment of benefit," and is practiced extensively.*
VI. The State, instead of itself exercising its own discretion and right of eminent domain (through its legislature or
otherwise), often deputes those powers to subordinate municipal bodies, as cities, towns and counties. When thus authorized to act, those bodies have all the powers of the State itself.
They are vested with a discretibn which is unlimited. They
are to be guided by their own judgment as to the economical
effects to be produced. The will of the majority is to govern
and the minority must submit. They may take the land of
an individual, and no power on earth can prevent. They may
raise the funds for compensation by general taxation, or by
the "assessment of benefit," as the State law provides.
The town of Salem, for example, might, beyond question, if
authorized by the legislature, open a road running from one
extreme of the town to the other, and might vote a tax for the
purpose, and the vote of the majority would bind the whole.
VII. It seems to us perfectly clear that the legislature of
Michigan might, in view of the profit to accrue to the State as
such lawfully itself, vote to take land for the Detroit and Howell Railroad, and might order a special tax to be levied upon
the lands to be specially benefited, for the purpose of paying
for the land taken. It might also, we submit, itself build the
road and levy a further tax on the same lands for that purpose.
If it could itself do this it could, we submit, deputo those
powers to subordinate municipal bodies. In doibg this it
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would do no more than is done every day in reference to road$
and streets.
If the town of Salem were thus authorized to tax the lands
situated within its limits, and if its constituted authorities, or
better s6t1, its citizens in corporate meeting assembled, were
to decide that all those lands would, in their judgment, be "specially benefited " by the railroad (as doubtless they would be),
we can see no reason why the vote of the majority would not
bind thewhole, as much as a vote of the legislature itself, -or
as much as a vote of the majority, in reference to a common
road. If the majority, when authorized by "thelegislature,
may In their discretion vote to bring the two ends of the town
up nearer together, we see no reason why they might not, if
so authorized, vote to bring the whole town, as a body, up
neare: to Detroit. Each of such votes is but the exercise, by
the town for the State, of a State political economy.
Such a power entrusted to a town may be liable to abuse.
But such abuse must consist only in an error of judgment a8
to the economical effect to be produced by the road. Such
errors do not, at least nowadays, often occur. A railroad is
sure to enhance the value of lands to an amount far beyond the
tax, and even the whole cost of the road. And besides, a town
is quite as little likely to error in judgment as the legislature.
But even if liable to abuse, that matter is one for the consideration of the legislature, and affords no ground for the interference of the courts.
. VIII. The State, instead of itself opening and building a railroad, may authorize a private corporation to do so; and in such
cases it vests the latter ivith its power of eminent domain though
not necessarily with its power of taxation. It also grants to
the company the exclusive right to carry passengers and freight
upon the road, and to charge a toll or compensation therefor.
This right to 'take toll is a franchise, to wit, a right which the
State itself can alone exercise, or authorize others to exercise.
The franchise is granted by the State for a consideration;
which is the outlay of money by the company in opening, building and preparing to operate the road; in its risk of loss of
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the money so invested; and in its obligation assumed to carry
all passengers and freight that offer. In England the right to
charge toll upon a turnpike (the king's highway) or upon a ferry
over a public stream, was granted only upon a similar consideration.
This deputing the power of eminent domain, and the grant
of right to carry for a toll, is a matter of convenience and
economy to the State. The business can all be done to much
better advantage by individuals than by the State; by private
citizens whose private pecuniary interests are involved, than
by public officers working upon a salary and liable to a removal at stated periods.
. The fact that the private corporation is sure to make money
by operating the road, has, we submit, nothing to do with the
question atissue. In the first place, the company invests beyond
recall and risks its capital--often a very large amount-it
incurs heavy obligations; for these it should be paid. In the
second place, this is a matter for the consideration of the legislature alone. If in view of the benefit to accrue to the State
finances,it sees fit liberally to reward the projectors of the enterprise, its decision is final. It is a matter of simple bargain and
contract. In the third place, as a general rule, no public improvements are ever undertaken except at the instance of individuals who expect to profit especially thereby. Citizens. generally, do not feel sufficient interest. The latter are to be
benefited, but only in a slight degree. The motive of self-interest is a most important one in public affairs. It is the
spur to vast public improvements, and the wise legislator will
not ignore or discountenance it, nor decline to avail himself ofit
Secondly, We now approach particular points made in the
opinion under consideration.
I. We agree entirely with the point that the three requisities
set out are necessary to the validity of any tax, to wit, that
the purpose must be public; the tax must be duly apportioned,
and if laid upon a limited district such district must be
"specially benefited." But we insist that these requisites are
a'] fully complied with in the case in question.
II. The learned judge compares this railroad to a hotel, and
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cites a Wisconsin case as deciding that a tax could not be raised
to build the the latter. This is, perhaps, not exactly a fair comparison, but yet something is to be said even as to such a case.
When individuals consent to reside in (say) a city, they agree
to be bound by the will of the majority in respect to certain
things. Those things are the matters which properly come
within the scope and purpose of a city government. To increase the taxable value of the lands lying within the city is
certainly within that scope and purpose. The opening of a
public square, the introduction of pure water, the draining of
a marsh and the like, all have that effect, and- are legitimate
objects for taxation. The erection of a hotel is very often
likely to do the same, and each and every house and lot in
the town is to yield and be worth the more for it.
A hotel attracts and detains visitors from abroad. Such
visitors become customers to the merchant, the mechanic and
others. Thehotel keeper mustbuy meats and other supplies for
them. All this makes the town lots used for business more
productive of return to human labor, and thus more able to
contribute to the public burdens. Lots for dwellings come into
demand and yield a higher rent. As a matter of equity, it
certainly is not fair that one obstinate lot owner should get
this benefit and yet not share a burden which the rest are
willing to assume. And as a matter of law we submit that
he is bound by the will of the majority.
There is of course a limit beyond which the power of the
majority cannot go. The rule is the same here as in every
other association. The avowed object and purpose of the association is always to be kept in view. That is What gives it
its distinctive character. To any attempt to go beyond that
purpose, the individual may say, non in haecftederaveni. A
temperance society could not compel its members to contribute money to build a bowling alley, nor a bank apply its capi.tal to manufacturing purposes. But a city government may,
we submit, put in exercise a political economy, and have a
discretion for that purpose not to be controled by the courts.
Such a power is, we submit, inherent in every body politic
and is implied if not expressed.
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The judge also compares the railroad to a grist mill. As to
that we desire merely to say, that in many of the States laws
exist by which lands may be taken for the purpose of flowage
in order to raise a water-power to carry the mill. This is done
under the power of eminent domain, and upon the ground that
the landistakenfor the public use. Suchuse (meaning always
benefit, profit,) consists only in the dimunition of distance and
expense, and the consequent increase ofnet income to adjoining
lands; thus creating additional taxable capital. This is pure
and genuine political economy. These laws have been stoutly
contested, but we believe their validity is now established
See Todd v."Autin, 8 Am. Law Reg., N. S. 9.
The learned judge likens the hackmen of Detroit to a rail.
road corporation, as carriers for hire. Those hackmen have
not, by the investment and risk of private capital, added a
hundred, or a thousand-fold to the pecuniary resources of the
State. They have not built the streets upon which they run;
they have not set distant localities up together, nor in any
manner benefited the State as a State.
III. The following passage occurs in the opinion: "If the
township of Salem can be required to tax itself in aid of the
Detroit and Howell Railroad Company, it must be either first
on the ground of incidental local benefit, in the enhancement of
values, or second in consideration of the facilities which the
road is to afford to the township for travel and business. The
first ground is wholly inadmissible. The incidental benefit
which any enterprise may bring to the public, has never been
recognized as sufficient of itself to bring the object within the
sphere of taxation. In the case of streets and similar public
improvements, the benefits received by individuals have sometimes been accepted as a proper basis on which to apportion
the burden; but in all such cases the power to tax is unquestionable, irrespective of the benefits. The question in such
cases has not been of the right to tax, bat of the proper basis
of apportionment, when the right was conceded.
The second ground is more plausible. To state the case in
the form of a contract, it would stand thus: The township is
to give or loan to the company five per cent. of its assessed
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valuation. In consideration whereof, the railroad company
agrees to construct hnd operate their road, and to hold themselves ready at all times to give to the people of the township
the facilities of travel and trade upon it, provided they will pay
for such facilities, the same rates which are charged to all other
persons. In other words, the company agree, on being secured
the stLm mentioned, to take upon themselves the businessof
common carriers within the limits of the twnship. If this consideration is sufficient in the case of common carriers, it must
be sufficient also in the case of any other employment."
This paragraph, we submit, is fallacious in many respects.
1. The judge makes a distinction, where there is, in fact, no
difference. The enhancement of value caused by the road is exactly the same thing as the facilities to be afforded for travel and
business. Or rather the one is merely the measure of the other.
The increase of value is simply the estimate expressed in dollars
and cents, which men put upon the facilities of communication.
Value is a thing not inherent in or attached to the land.
like shape, color, or the like. It exists in men s minds. In
putting a value upon the land, men take into view surrounding facts precisely as does a jury in estimating value or damage.
Those facts lend a hue to the thing in question. Men look
through them as at a landscape through stained glass.
The road is a fact, present or prospective. A right of way
or travel over it exists in favor of the lands or their occupants.
The road is an appurtenance to the lands, made so by the act
of the legislature. In view of this fact and of theprospective
savings of time and expense of travel and transportation, men
begin to consider the land desirable as a location for business or
residence, and will pay the more for it. The facility of communication is, therefore, the physical, material effect produced
by the road; the increase of value the moral mental effect produced by the same means and at the same instant. One is the
benefit, the other what that benefit is decided worth. A little
reflection will, we think, convince any one that the increase of
values in any locality caused by a railroad is traceable directly
and exclusively to the fact that the lands are set up nearer to
some other business locality, and that such increase of value
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represents or measures all the value to all the world, of the
faculty of communication-that the benefit of the road to an
individual traveling it, say the farmer, is that it saves his time,
which time saved is to be devoted to labor on his farm, making
the latter more productive; and that the increase' of value thus
caused to the farm is exactly the measure of the value of the
saving of time to the individual, the farmer. There is a
philosophy in this matter, which may not at first sight appear,
but will do so fully on reflection. A farm is enhanced in value
by the road, say five thousand dollars. This is but saying that
the facility of communication is worth to it that sum. The expression, five thousand dollars' worth of facility, is but another
term for the facility itself; precisely as five thousand dollars'
worth of wheat is the same thing as the wheat.
If we are correct in our view, then' a taxing based upon
these facilities or their value is precisely the same thing as
one based upon the increased values of the lands.
2. The incidental benefit to accrue to lands from a public improvement, to wit, the increase of value or the material benefit
which is represented or measured by such increase of value,
has, we submit, always and everywhere been recognized as
sufficient of itself to bring the object within the sphere of taxation or assessment. This is, indeed, the only legal or just rule
or object, for burden should be assessed upon and proportioned
to benefit. We deny that the power of taxation-meaning
special taxation or assessment to pay for a particular improve
ment-does exist irrespective of the benefit to be conferred by
it. All lands in the State may be taxed for general purposes,
as to pay State salaries and the like, on the ground of benefit,
to wit, protection, received by each and every tract; but no
tax upon a limited district could lawfully be laid for such a
general purpose, nor for any purpose except to pay for "special benefit" accruing to that district.
3. The term "incidental" is not properly applicable to this
increase of value, for it is the primary, direct andimmediate end
and object sought by the legislature, and the effect directly and
immediatelyproduced; such increase of value being, as we have
sadd, but the representative in money of the facility of commu-
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nication. - What benefits may be styled incidental we shall
not stop to inquire, but surely this increase of value is not one.
IV. The learned judge says further: "There is nothing in
the business of carrying goods and passengers which gives
the person who conducts it a claim upon the public different
in its nature from that of the manufacturer or the merchant."
To this proposition we assent. But the operating of the railroad, when once built, is a thing entirely distinct and different
from that of the opening and building. It is the latter, not the
former, which is the consideration rendered to the State. It is
the investment, in perpetuity and upon risk, of a large amount
of private capital in such manner as to add to the wealth and
power of the State as a State. Such an investment is the actual
burying of so much money in the ground, and is beyond recall.
The carrying of passengers and goods for hire is a different
matter; such business is unquestionably a private business,
but the right to carry it on is the very thing which the State
guaranteed or granted in consideration of the permanent investment made for its benefit.
V. The learned judge says: "When the State itself is to
receive the benefit of the taxation in the increase of its public
fund, or the improvement of its property, there can be no
doubt of the public character of the enterprise."
This is doubtless the true doctrine. The question then comes
to this: Does the opening of a railroad increase the public fund ?
That it does so in almost if not quite every instance there can
be no sort of doubt. It develops lands otherwise wholly unproductive and valueless. Many a railroad has turned out profitless to the stockholders, and the money capital contributed has
been wholly sunk. But yet the road has benefited the State
as such, and added to its taxable capital ten-fold its cost. For
example, the railroads in Vermont have, we believe, not paid
the stockholders; but the State as a State is to-day far in advance of her former position in wealth and resources, simply
by the building of those roads. Her farms, her marble quarries and other industries are all paying well. The owners of
such properties could well have afforded to build the roads at
their own expense. If they have, in fact, contributed to the
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capital and have lost, yet their loss is far more than made up
in the increase of net annual income and consequent enhancement of market values to their property. The State as a unit
thrives, as every State does, just in proportion to the thrift and
prosperity of its owners of land and other fixed property.
Undoubtedly distress has been caused to individuals in some.
of the States by the issue of town or county bonds, and the levy
of taxes to pay them. For example, a farmer is called upon to
pay his tax who has little or no ready money. His lands to
be sure are valuable-made so by the very railroad. He could,
if he chose, sell it for twice as much as before, but he desires
not to sell. To raise the -money is to him a serious burden.
But such a case of individual hardship must not stand in the
way of great public improvements. Every individual who
settles in a community and invests in real estate assumes the
risk of just such hardship. In the case put, the hardship comes
from the very fact that the former is actually possessed of property, and is rich. It is one of the incidents of wealth, an
instance of embarrsdes richesses. Many a man would gladly

assume the hardship if the wealth also accompanied it.
In opening streets in cities, it often happens that a lot is
enhanced greatly in value, but is owned by one who has no
ready money or other available property. The assessment for
benefit is in such a case a grievous burden, bat it must be borne.
Finally. It will not be denied that as a general rule the
legislature of a State has an unlimited discretion to decide
whether a proposed improvement will or will not increase the
wealth of the State, and thus be for a public use, nor that the
legislature of Michigan has in the present case decided, tacitly
it may be, that the railroad in question will have that effect.
It would not otherwise have permitted the majority in the
towns named to have voted a tax.
We may admit that if a legislature should be so wicked as
to authorize such a tax in a case where the effect must be npt
to increase the wealth of the State as such, but merely of a
private individual (though it is hard to conceive such a case,
for the wealth of the individual citizens is the wealth of the
State) the courts might interfere. But they should be very

